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LEGAL LIMITS ON THE STRUCTURED
SETTLEMENT OF DAMAGES
RICHARD LEWIS*
A STRUCTURED settlement is a new way of paying common law
damages for personal injury or death. It has received strong support
from the judiciary and a very favourable response from the Law
Commission in its recent consultation paper.1 The defendant's insurer,
usually after having informally agreed a lump sum figure with the
plaintiff, will agree to convert part of the damages into a series of
periodic payments. To fund the arrangement the insurer purchases
an annuity from a life office. The payments are "structured" to meet
the individual's needs and are free of tax in the plaintiffs hands. This
is because the Revenue have accepted that they may be considered
instalments of capital rather than income. In return for making this
arrangement the insurer will bargain for a discount on the conven-
tional lump sum figure. Although the first structure was put in place
as long ago as 1981, they were not used in other than a few isolated
cases until 1991. Now there are almost two hundred of them, and the
annuity market, worth £30 million last year, is expected to grow
rapidly. Their increasing use constitutes the most radical reform of
our damages system effected in recent years.
Nevertheless, few articles have been written on the subject.2
There is a dearth of information about how structures have developed
and the ways in which they are presently being used. This article
deals with an important, topical area of law reform which does not
* Senior Lecturer, Cardiff Law School, University of Wales.
' Structured Settlements and Interim and Provisional Damages, Consultation Paper No. 125,
November 1992, reviewed by the author in (1993) 137(2) SoI.J. 36.
2
 But see the author's previous articles "Pensions Replace Lump Sum Damages" (1988) 15 Journal
of Law and Society 392; "Structured Settlements in Practice" (1991) 10 Civil Justice Q. 212;
"Structured Settlements in Britain and Canada" (1993) 42 I.C.L.Q. (forthcoming); and "The
Merits of a Structured Settlement: The Plaintiff's Perspective" (1993) 13 O.J.L.S. 530. For other
academic reviews of developments in this country see Allen, "Structured Settlements" (1988)
104 L.Q.R. 448, and Scott (1988) 7 Civil Justice Q. 99. There are many articles by practitioners
e.g. Edwards (1989) 86 L.S.Gaz. (26 July); Frenkel, "Structured Settlements: Practical Considera-
tions" (1989) 5 Personal & Medical Injuries Law Letter (April and May); Hulls, "Structuring
Personal Injury Awards" (1990) 87 L.S.Gaz. (21 March); Holloway, "Everyone's a Winner"
(1992) 152 Post and Insurance Monitor (12 Sept.); Frenkel, "Salvaging the Wreckage and Healing
the Wounds" (1992) 136 Sol.J. 8; Whitficld, "The Basics and Tactics of Structured Settlements"
(1992) 142 N.L.J. 135. There are now two books on the subject,
I. Goldrein and M. dc Haas, Structured Settlements (1993), and R. Lewis, Structured Settlements:
The Law and Practice (1993).
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result from new legislation or case law. There is still no official law
report of any structured settlement case. Instead many of the sources
upon which the author has relied are unpublished. These comprise
transcripts of cases, proceedings of conferences and files and case
reports from a variety of firms and organisations. In addition the
author has interviewed many of those occupied with the matter,
including lawyers, accountants, tax and insurance representatives as
well as the leading intermediaries involved in negotiating such
settlements.
The article examines the legal limits upon the types of case which
may be settled by this means. A plaintiff has always been able to use
the damages obtained from any form of litigation to buy an annuity,
but tax must be paid on the income it produces. In practice therefore
such arrangements are not made. The tax advantage gained by a
structured settlement is exceptional. It applies only in favour of
certain types of case.
First, these cases must be funded from particular sources. Thus
certain insurers who do not pay corporation tax are not able to obtain
the tax benefit, and in practice have not been involved in structures.3
Nor can a structure be used if the defendant does not owe an
"antecedent debt" as required by the case law upon which the
Revenue rely.4 This may prevent the structuring of the ex gratia
compensation awarded by the Motor Insurers Bureau or the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Board, for there is no possibility of these
bodies being held legally liable to pay.
Secondly, the benefit of a structure may only apply to a particular
type of legal action. The Revenue are concerned that the tax position
be limited to cases involving debts arising as a result of personal
injury actions; it does not wish to see structures extended to other
forms of litigation or to debts arising in other circumstances.
The third limit upon cases which may be structured is that certain
procedures must be followed. These require that the annuity be
purchased and owned by the defendant, not the plaintiff; if at any
time the plaintiff becomes formally entitled to a lump sum payment
then it is too late to arrange a structure of that money. The dangers
of reaching a binding settlement agreement or obtaining a formal
court order for a lump sum are therefore explained below. To begin,
however, there is a need to correct certain mistaken views concerning
cases which can, in fact, be structured.
1
 However, non-liability to corporation tax has not prevented Health Authorities from arranging
structures. By s. 5I9A of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 the Authorities arc tax
exempt, and arc able to reclaim the tax withheld from annuity payments made to them.
4
 The main authority is Dotl v. Brown (1936) 154 L.T. 484; |1936| 1 All E.R. 543. For detailed
analysis sec Lewis, "The Tax Treatment of Structured Settlements" (1993) British Tax Review
(forthcoming).
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I. DISPELLING DOUBTS ABOUT CASES WHICH CAN BE STRUCTURED
A. Where there is a Dispute about Liability
Structures are not confined to cases where full liability exists; it makes
no difference whether or not there is contributory negligence.5 If the
parties are able to reach an informal agreement as to the sum to be
structured, their reasons for agreeing that particular sum are of no
concern. Cases have been structured where there was never any joint
view as to the degree of contributory negligence involved. This, of
course, may also happen in conventional lump sum settlements.
B. Where a Fatal Accident is Involved
Fatal Accidents Act cases can be structured. The first was set up in
1992 for the benefit of Mrs. Boobbyer, the wife of a surgeon killed in
a road accident.6 A previous High Court hearing on the issue of
liability had determined that the surgeon was 50 per cent, to blame,
but neither his death, nor the finding of contributory negligence
against him, prevented a structure for £350,000 from being put in
place for his wife. In another case in that same year structures for
dependent children were put in place for the first time following a
fatal accident.7
C. Cases Involving Several Defendants
Structuring can be arranged here in either of two ways.
(1) Separate settlements can be made with each defendant, some
or all of them agreeing to put in place their own structure for the
plaintiff.
(2) Alternatively, one defendant can agree to implement a single
structure on behalf of the others. This defendant would receive
contributions from the others to cover their agreed share of the
premium, and to meet the operating and administrative costs of the
structure.
5
 E.g., Boobbyer v. Johnson, The Times, 21 January 1992, the case of NJO cited in Kemp and
Kemp, The Quantum of Damages, para. 6A-047, and Moxon v. Senior, unrcportcd transcript 10
July 1991, where the damages were reduced by a third for contributory negligence. P. Corncs,
Coping with Catastrophic Injury (1993) p. 22 reveals that of cases settled for £150,000 or more
by insurers in 1987 and 1988 there were clear indications of reductions for contributory negligence
in only nine per cent, of cases, but it features in the negotiations in other cases without the
outcome being clear.
6
 Ibid. For further details see Bawdon, "A System where Both Sides Win?" (1992) 6(6) The
LawyerS.
7
 Greene v. Moore, unreported, transcript 9 October 1992.
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D. Where there has been a Payment into Court
The tax-free benefit of a structure is lost if a plaintiff formally accepts
a lump sum paid into court under R.S.C. Ord. 22. Nothing can be
done retrospectively if a binding contract for the settlement of a case
has been concluded. If plaintiffs' lawyers fail to appreciate this they
may expose themselves to an action for negligence. Unless it is
formally accepted, a payment into court does not of itself preclude a
successful structured settlement, although it may cause a minor
logistical problem in obtaining the monies lodged with the court funds
office. There is also a danger that the monies in court will be paid out
direct to the life office, instead of being returned to the defendant's
solicitors, the liability insurer then providing the funds for the
purchase of the annuity. More important is the fact that a payment
in may lead to a more aggressive adversarial approach, and can put
pressure on the plaintiff to think only in terms of the conventional
lump sum. It can thus impede any discussion of a structure.
E. Where a Court Judgment is Involved
A court has no power to order a structure against the wishes of either
of the parties. Even where the parties are both prepared to arrange a
structure they will be prevented from doing so if there is a judgment
awarding damages and a formal order is made which entitles the
plaintiff to a lump sum. Again this is because a structure cannot be
organised retrospectively; if the plaintiff is legally entitled to a lump sum
it is too late to arrange instalment payments on favourable tax terms.
This limit upon structuring is made less significant by two factors.
First, it remains comparatively rare for damages to be awarded by a
judge as opposed to being agreed by the parties;8 and secondly,
certain decisions made by a court need not prevent the parties from
arranging a structure if they both agree to do so. For example, a
court judgment solely concerning liability will not preclude a struc-
ture.9 Even a judgment awarding damages will not do so if the parties
request the judge to make only findings of fact as to the value of the
heads of claim.10 Using this indication of the amount of damages the
judge has in mind, the parties may then adjourn to investigate
whether a structure might be arranged before any formal order
' P. Cornes, Coping With Catastrophic Injury (1993), p. 20 reveals that even in cases involving
damages of f 150,000 or more paid by insurers in 1987 and 1988, only 10 per cent, were the result
of formal court judgments. Whether this figure includes consent orders is not known. Of
personal injury claims in general-—most being for very small sums—only one per cent, get as far
as the door of a court. Report of The Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation
for Personal Injury (1978, Cmnd. 7054) vol. 2, table 12.
' As in the Boobbyer case above.
' There is power to do this under R.S.C. Ord. 33, r. 3.
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discharging the action by consent is sought.11 The plaintiff may seek
an undertaking from the defendant that interest will be paid from the
adjournment either to the date of the structure, or if the structure
fails, to the date when the lump sum is eventually paid.12
F. Settlements out of Court where no Judge may be Involved
Provided that the plaintiff is not under any disability which prevents
him from understanding the nature of the proposed settlement, there
is no reason why a court need be involved in a structure. In half of
the structures presently in place, however, the court's approval was
necessary because the plaintiff was either a minor or had been
mentally impaired by the accident. This meant that the consent of
the Court of Protection as well as that of the High Court was
required.13
II. CASES WHERE THE TAX POSITION DISCOURAGES A STRUCTURE
A. Where a Mutual Insurance Company is Involved
A mutual insurance company has no shareholders. Its owners are its
policyholders and they share in the profits it makes. At present
mutual insurers can only take part in structures if they are prepared
to accept a tax loss. In practice, therefore, no structures have been
put in place directly involving such companies. Although there are
relatively few mutual as opposed to proprietary companies, and in
spite of the fact that several of them have recently transformed
themselves into proprietary companies, they constitute a significant
part of the market against which there is discrimination with regard
to structures.
The discrimination arises because of the tax position of the mutual
insurer. The Revenue at present require that the life office pays tax
on the payments arising from the annuities which form the structure,
with the result that the liability insurer must gross them up in order
for the plaintiff to receive the payments in full. The liability insurer
reclaims the grossed-up amount by offsetting it against its liability to
pay corporation tax. Mutual insurers cannot offset this amount
11
 As in Payne v. Thackray (1991) 7 Personal and Medical Injuries Law Letter 60.
12
 The plaintiff may seek interest at the highest rate, as prescribed by the Judgment Act 1838,
s. 17, and an undertaking from the defendant may help avoid the difficulties in obtaining this
rate which may be caused by Thomas v. Bunn [1991] 1 A.C. 362. Claiming interest is also
referred to by Whitfield, "The Basics And Tactics Of Structured Settlements" (1992) 142 New
L.J. 135.
13
 Under. R.S.C. Ord. 80. As indicated above, the need for such consent does not bar a structure.
According to the evidence submitted to the Law Commission by the Master of the Court of
Protection in March 1993, the court had participated in 87 structures. The author estimates this
to be about half of all the structures which had been put in place at that time.
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because they do not pay corporation tax on their trading operations;
they trade only with their own members and do not make a taxable
trading profit. They are, however, taxed on their investment income.
The money arising from the annuity is treated as investment income
and has tax withheld by the life office, but the payments to the
plaintiff which must be made are considered to be part of the mutual
activity and cannot be offset against the investment income. Any
structure would therefore have to write off the tax suffered on the
investment income, and this makes them uneconomic.
This does not mean that a mutual insurer can never be involved
in a structure. There have already been three types of case where,
albeit indirectly, such companies have been involved. In the first of
them a wholly owned subsidiary, not itself a mutual company, was
able to structure because of its different tax position. In the second
there was another insurer also defending the case in addition to the
mutual company, and a deal was struck to take advantage of that
insurer's tax position. The third case involved the insured party itself
standing in place of the mutual insurer in the structuring agreement.
Using the insurance money it obtained from the mutual company,
the insured party then purchased the annuities directly, and used its
own tax position to reclaim the grossed-up amount. The case in which
this happened involved the Municipal Mutual, formerly the insurer
of most local authorities.14 The insured, Westminster City Council,
was substituted for the insurer in the structuring agreement, the judge
being convinced that the local authority was substantial enough to be
able to ensure that the payments would continue for the period of
time envisaged.15 It received the insurance monies from the mutual
company to enable it to purchase the annuity, and thus the insurance
company was able to participate indirectly in the structure that was
set up.
The Law Commission considers that the disincentive on mutual
insurers' taking part in structures is significant. It provisionally
proposes that one of two solutions be adopted. It suggests that the
Revenue should permit mutual companies to reclaim the tax, just as
Health Authorities have now been permitted to do16 Alternatively,
and this is the more radical solution, it would allow the life office to
pay the instalments of damages in full and directly to the plaintiff,
thus cutting out the need for the liability insurer to gross-up and
reclaim the payments. It supports legislation to allow the same tax-
14
 Marshall v. Westminster City Council, unreported, transcript 8 March 1991.
15
 This was a fortunate decision because in fact it was the Municipal Mutual that later become
insolvent. Most of its obligations were taken over by the Zurich Insurance Company in early
1993.
16
 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 125, op. cit. note 1 above, para. 3.32.
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free status to be given to all annuities bought by defendants in actions
for personal injury. Careful definition of "personal injury" would be
required to ensure that advantage could not be taken of the resulting
tax benefits by others seeking to avoid the sharply different treatment
accorded by the Revenue to income as opposed to capital.17 In other
respects the actual mechanics of the change could be implemented
easily.18 This reform would also assist the other non-taxpayers
discussed below to participate in the benefits of a structure. It would
thus create a "level playing field" for all, instead of the current
position where the plaintiff's ability to structure depends upon the
nature of the organisation funding the damages.
B. Cases against Medical Defence Organisations
Mutual indemnity associations in effect insure doctors against liability
without themselves being classified as insurance companies.19 Their
tax position is similar to the mutual companies discussed above and
this discourages the implementation of a structure.20 In addition,
concern has been expressed as to the long-term security of any
arrangement entered into with one of these organisations.
The importance of the defence organisations to the compensation
system has, however, recently been much reduced. This is because
there has been a change in the way in which compensation is
funded following a successful claim for negligence against a hospital.
Following the introduction of "NHS Indemnity" in 1990,21 District
Health Authorities now assume responsibility for all new and existing
claims of medical negligence. They no longer require their staff to
subscribe to a defence organisation nor do they seek a contribution
from such an organisation if damages must be paid. Defence organisa-
tions now only have a role to play where injury results exclusively from
medical negligence which is not connected with hospital treatment, as
when it occurs in treatment given by a general practitioner. The
limitation upon structuring therefore affects only a minority of
medical cases, for if a hospital is involved and the liability of the
Health Authority is in question then a structure can be put in place.
17
 It has been suggested that some form of policing of the new class of tax-free annuities might be
required. Safeguards could include requiring that the court approve any settlement involving
such annuities, or that solicitors for both sides should certify that the annuity was purchased in
respect of a personal injury case. See Ashcroft, "Structured Settlements; A Practitioner's
Viewpoint", p. 4 (unpublished paper presented to the Law Commission, June 1992).
18
 Ibid.
19
 Medical Defence Union v. Department of Trade and Industry [1980] Ch. 82.
20
 E v i d e n c e of t he Medical Defence U n i o n to the Law Commiss ion , D e c e m b e r 1992. H o w e v e r ,
the MDU has been involved with two structures in Canada.
21
 P. Fenn and R. Dingwall, "Medical Negligence and Crown Indemnity" in A. Harrison and J.
Gretton (eds.), Health Care Law UK 1989 (1990); M. Jones, Medical Negligence (1991) p. 290;
Lewis, "Health Authorities and the Payment of Damages by Means of a Pension" (1993) 56
M.L.R. 844.
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C. Where Foreign Insurers are Involved
Even if foreign insurers transact no business in this country, they may
still become liable to pay claims brought by British residents. This
may occur, for example, where their insured party is involved in a
motor accident while visiting Britain.22 A plaintiff in such a case may
not benefit from a structure if the foreign insurer's tax position is
such that it is unable to reclaim the amount by which it grosses-up
the payments to the plaintiff. Such an insurer would then suffer from
the same disincentive to structure as affects mutual insurers and
medical defence organisations. Whether a foreign insurer is actually
affected in this way depends upon whether it must pay tax on the
annuity under its own domestic law, and whether the particular
country involved has entered into a double tax treaty with Britain.23
Even if in law a foreign insurer can reclaim or avoid paying tax upon
the annuity, the complexities are such that it may wish to avoid using
this form of settlement. In addition the concern of plaintiffs that the
long-term arrangement made by a structure may not prove secure is
made greater where a foreign insurer is involved: it is less likely that
there will be any financial safety net if such an insurer becomes
insolvent.
The problem will be made more serious with the expansion in the
market for overseas insurers following the introduction of "freedom
of services" within the European Community.24 Although foreign
insurers will be required to appoint an agent in this country to deal
with claims, the compensation paid will be funded from a foreign
source, and therefore is likely to give rise to the tax disincentive to
structure.
22
 In fact the claim is usually dealt with by the Motor Insurers' Bureau, acting in its capacity as the
UK Green Card Bureau. Under a system organised under the auspices of the United Nations
the Bureau is deemed to be the insurer acting on behalf of 31 countries which have signed
certain agreements. However, the funds for the settlement will derive from the overseas insurer.
23
 If so it is possible to apply for a certificate of exemption under the Double Taxation Relief
(Taxes On Income) (General) Regulations 1970 (S.I. No. 488). The annuity may then be paid
to the plaintiff gross, thus saving the foreign insurer the need to reclaim the tax. No allowance
for this possibility was made by Newstead, "The View from Somerset House" (1989) 7(10) The
Litigation Letter 78. He refers to the need to deduct tax in the case of a foreign insurer as an
"absolute requirement" under The Income And Corporation Taxes Act 1988, s. 437(1). This
ignores s. 788(3) of that Act which permits the provisions of a double tax treaty to override
anything to the contrary in UK domestic law.
24
 The various EC directives are discussed by Devine in (1993) 81 B.Ins.L.J. 10, and Coates,
"Europe and the Way Ahead" (1993) 2 International Insurance Law Review 38. They are
contained in J. Maitland-Walker, EC Insurance Directives.
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III. CASES WHICH CANNOT BE STRUCTURED
A. Where Either of the Parties Refuses to Structure
Structures can only be arranged if both parties consent. They must
freely enter into the settlement contract. Neither can be compelled
to do so even by a court. This was decided in Burke v. Tower Hamlets
Health Authority25 where the judge refused an application for an
order that the defendant pay the plaintiff's nursing home costs not in
one lump sum, but as they arose during the remainder of the plaintiff's
life. Although this decision has not gone without criticism,26 the same
conclusion was reached shortly thereafter by the Supreme Court of
Canada.27 The Law Commission is at present considering whether
the court should be given the power to impose a structure against the
wishes of either of the parties.28
B. Where the Plaintiff has Received or is Entitled to a Lump Sum
under a Formal Settlement or Court Order
The utmost care should be taken to ensure that the defendant has
not already discharged his debt before entering into the structured
settlement. If he has, it will prevent any structuring of the monies
involved even if both parties wish to make such an arrangement. The
transaction will be treated as the purchase of an annuity by the
plaintiff, and the tax benefits are then lost. This was confirmed by the
Inland Revenue after they had been approached by Frenkel Topping
on behalf of parties who had already made a formal settlement.29
There have been cases in the USA where structures failed because
plaintiffs' lawyers only contacted brokers after receiving cheques
from defendants.30 No formal settlement should be agreed before the
arrangements for a structure are put in place.
Formal court orders must similarly be avoided.31 However, as
explained above, a structure is not necessarily precluded by the need
to go to court to obtain a ruling. The number of cases of personal
injury that actually proceed to judgment as opposed to being settled
25
 The Times, 10 August 1989.
26
 Croxon, "Has a Court Power to Make an Order other than a Lump Sum for Damages for
Personal Injury?" (July 1990) AVMA Medical and Legal Journal 4.
27
 Watkins v. Olafson (1990) 50 C.C.L.T. 101.
28
 Op. cit. note 1 above, para. 3.71 et seq.
29
 Kemp and Kemp, The Quantum of Damages, para. 6A-058.
30
 Macmillan and Yamasaki, "Myths and Misconceptions Concerning Structured Settlements"
(1987) 20 Hawaii Bar Journal 137 at p. 143.
31
 This may not always be easy to achieve. For example, even though an insurer may be entitled
to avoid a defendant's liability policy in respect of a road accident, the insurer may be obliged
to satisfy any judgment obtained against the defendant. The insurer's obligation stems from the
Road Traffic Act 1989, s. 151, but it does not arise until seven days after the date of judgment.
A structure may therefore only be possible if the insurer agrees that the formal proceedings
required under the Act need not be instituted.
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are relatively few: the Pearson Commission found that they numbered
only one per cent, of all the cases brought, although this figure
included even small claims, which are almost bound to be settled.32
However, the more serious the case, the greater the likelihood that a
court appearance will prove necessary. It seems anomalous that in
spite of the parties' consent, no structure is possible in these cases
unless great care is taken in drafting the orders made by the court.
The Law Commission are therefore in favour of legislation to enable
judges to order a structure where the parties consent to it.33
C. Criminal Injuries Compensation
The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme was set up in 1964.34 It
enables those who suffer personal injury as a result of a crime to
claim compensation from the state, unless their injury relates to an
accident involving a motor vehicle.35 The compensation is assessed
using common law principles, and therefore in cases of serious injury
it can amount to substantial sums. At present, however, there is no
way in which this money can be structured. The main reason for this
relates to the status of the scheme itself: it is administrative in nature
with payments being made by a Board ex gratia. Although legislation
which would put it on a statutory basis has been passed, it is not yet
in force, and there are no current plans to implement it.36 Accordingly
a decision of the Board does not "give the applicant any right to sue
either the Board or the Crown for that sum".37 Since the Board is not
under a legal obligation to make payments, claimants cannot establish
that there is an "antecedent debt" owed to them. It was held in Dott
v. Brown3S that it is essential for such a debt to exist in order for the
periodic payments under a structure to be considered capital and not
subject to tax.
The Law Commission view this as most unsatisfactory. The ex
32
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Personal Injury (1978; Cmnd. 7054),
vol. 2, table 104.
33
 Op. cit. note 1 above, para. 3.38. There was a suggestion that the court had such a power in
Metcalfv. London Passenger Transport Board [1938] 2 All E.R. 352.
34
 See D. R. Miers, Compensation for Criminal Injuries (1990), D. Greer, Criminal Injuries
Compensation (1991), and D. Foster, Claiming on the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board
(1991).
35
 The presumption then being that compulsory liability insurance will be in force and that
compensation can be obtained at common law, or from the Motor Insurers Bureau as discussed
below. There are other exceptions to the scheme, including injuries received as a result of
domestic violence.
36
 The Criminal Justice Act 1988, ss. 108-117 establish the scheme, but under s. 171(1) it only
comes into effect from a day to be appointed. Miers, op. cit., p. 11 states that this is some years
away.
37
 Per Diplock L.J. in R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p. Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 864,
883.
38
 (1936) 154 L.T. 484; [1936] 1 All E.R. 543.
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gratia nature of the payments is a fiction in practice because the
Board is in effect compelled to compensate all those who come within
its terms, refusal to do so being subject to challenge by judicial
review. Reliance upon this fiction to exclude victims of crime from
the benefits of structuring is seen as anomalous. The Commission are
in favour of extending those benefits to all victims of personal injury
who purchase annuities with the damages awarded to them.39 Its
preferred solution departs entirely from the limitations imposed by
Dott v. Brown. It would legislate to allow a life office to pay directly
to a plaintiff the instalments of damages arranged by the liability
insurer. In addition, the life office would be allowed to pay the
plaintiff in full, without deducting any of the tax withheld at present,
provided that the case involved personal injury and fell within
permitted limits. These would be denned so as to include claims made
for criminal injuries compensation.
If this tax problem is solved a second issue then arises. Does the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board have the power to purchase
annuities and award compensation in the form of a structured
settlement? This is presently being considered by the Home Office
who are responsible for the scheme.40 Although the rules of the
scheme state that compensation is normally to take the form of a
lump sum, the Board is given a general discretion to make special
arrangements for the administration of an award. It may be that this
is sufficient for it to implement structured awards.41 If, however, the
legislation which puts the scheme on a statutory basis were to be
implemented, the Board would undoubtedly have the power to buy
annuities in the same way that Health Authorities, as Crown bodies,
have recently been able to do. Despite the preliminary inquiry of the
Home Office into the feasibility of structuring,42 such settlements
cannot realistically be contemplated until the status and powers of
the Board are made clear and the tax position is changed.
In March 1993 the Home Secretary announced that changes were
to be made to the basis upon which compensation is to be paid.43 The
present scheme is to be replaced by a tariff system from April 1994.
Compensation will no longer be assessed on the basis of common law
damages, but will be related to the severity of the injury suffered
rather than its effect upon the individual. Although the details are
39
 Op. cit. note 1 above, para. 3.33.
40
 Letter from the Home Office to the Commission, 14 July 1992.
41
 See paras. 9 and 12 of the revised 1990 scheme, H.L.Deb. vol. 163, cols 410-417, 8 December
1989; Greer, op. cit., appendix B. However, the Commission suggests that the scheme might
require amendment.
42
 Frenkel Topping in its evidence to the Law Commission, April 1993, note that they were
consulted by the Board who, at that stage, were hoping eventually to follow the path of Health
Authorities and themselves fund structures.
43
 H.C.Deb. vol. 221, cols. 501-507 (18 March 1993).
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not yet settled, the new scheme will continue to be non-statutory and
its payments ex gratia.** This will continue to prevent the claims being
structured.
IV. CASES WHERE DOUBT EXISTS AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF
STRUCTURING
A. Motor Insurers' Bureau Cases
The MIB is a guarantee fund set up by all motor insurers in order to
compensate the victims of uninsured and untraced motorists who
cause injury as a result of their negligent driving.45 Some of these
cases involve very severe injuries: at present the Board is dealing
with 300 cases in each of which half a million pounds is at stake.
There are about 25 new such cases each year, in addition to
thousands of smaller claims. The Bureau was formed in 1946 after
the Government put pressure on insurers to close some of the
loopholes which left certain persons injured through the fault of
drivers without an effective right to common law damages.46 The
Bureau is not the product of legislation, but operates on the basis of
a series of agreements with the Secretary of State for Transport.47 Its
constitution is therefore extremely unusual, and leaves victims with
no direct right of action against the Bureau itself.
The peculiar status of the Bureau gives rise to problems with
regard to structuring which are very similar to those already discussed
in relation to criminal injuries. Again difficulties are caused because
ex gratia payments may be involved, and there are doubts about the
tax status of the organisation and whether it has the power to purchase
annuities. It pays only minimal corporation tax and even if it were
able to structure it would suffer from the same problem which affects
mutual insurers: it would be unable to reclaim the amount of tax
deducted at source by the life office.48 The Law Commission here
favours the removal of these disincentives to structure just as they do
in cases of criminal injury and claims against mutual insurers. It
proposes that any annuity purchased by defendants (to include the
MIB) in respect of a personal injury claim be paid directly to the
44
 Letter from the Home Office to the Law Commission, 13 April 1993.
45
 D.B. Williams, The Motor Insurers Bureau; P.S. Atiyah, Accidents Compensation and The Law
(4th ed., 1987) pp. 247-252; R.L. Colinvaux, The Law of Insurance (6th ed., 1990) pp. 350-
362.
46
 Lewis, "Insurers' Agreements not to Enforce Strict Legal Rights" (1985) 48 M.L.R. 275, 279.
47
 The current agreements are reproduced in I. Goldrein and M. de Haas, Buttenvorths Personal
Injury Litigation Service, vol. 1, Div. 3F.
48
 Even if the tax could be reclaimed problems would be caused by the Bureau's present system of
funding. This is based upon insurers contributing to the cost of claims paid in the current year
rather than when the accident occurred.
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plaintiff by the life insurer without deduction of tax.49 Although the
Bureau agrees that this would solve the majority of its problems,
other administrative difficulties would remain.50 Its preferred solution
is to allow plaintiffs themselves to use their compensation to purchase
tax-free annuities directly.51
As yet no case involving the MIB has been structured. Whether
it is possible to do so depends upon which of the three classes of case
dealt with by the MIB is being considered. Although the position
remains uncertain, it may be that the first of them considered below
can be structured, whereas the preliminary view of the Revenue upon
the other two is that they cannot be structured.
1. A driver with insurance which can be avoided by the insurer
Here an insurer issues a policy in respect of the defendant, but is
entitled to avoid it because, for example, it was obtained as a result
of a misrepresentation.52 Insurers engaged in underwriting motor
liability are all bound by the "domestic regulations"53 under which
the insurer who issued the policy in the first place will not throw the
liability back upon the financial pool created by the MIB, but instead
will use its own resources to meet the claim. Acting on behalf of the
MIB, Frenkel Topping have received a carefully worded letter from
the Revenue.54 It states: "It would seem from your description of the
normal settlement procedure for [this class of case] that no special
factors arise which would prevent the plaintiff from settling his or her
claim by entering into an agreement with the 'Domestic Insurer' in
terms which would generate a structured series of capital payments."
This letter may be viewed with some optimism. Those hoping to
extend structures may point to the importance of the contract which
existed between the defendant driver and the insurer, for this may
form some basis for establishing an antecedent debt owed by that
insurer. On the other hand others may be more dubious about the
possibility of structuring even these claims. After all the contract was
avoided by the insurer, and some other basis for establishing the debt
may be required, as discussed under the next heading.
49
 Op. cit. note 1 above, paras. 3.33 and 3.36.
50
 For example, the Bureau deals with claims by allocating them to insurers to handle on its behalf.
It would be unlikely that the additional costs resulting from a structure would be spread equally
among its members, and a system of compensation would have to be devised.
51
 Evidence of the MIB to the Law Commission, March 1993.
52
 Avoidance is possible under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 152(2).
53
 The memorandum and articles of association of the Bureau were amended in June 1992 so as to
replace the "domestic agreement", and avoid the necessity for changes having to be signed by
every member of the Bureau.
54
 Ashcroft, op. cit. note 17 above, p. 15. Certain information given in this section has been
supplied to the author by Mr. Snook, claims manager for the Bureau.
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2. An identified driver who has no insurance policy
Unlike the domestic regulations cases, here there is no obvious
insurer to take responsibility for the liability of the particular driver
known to have caused the accident. The Bureau therefore becomes
directly involved. It tries to establish a contractual relationship with
the uninsured driver by offering to act on his behalf in return for an
undertaking that it should have the right to reclaim from that driver
any compensation it pays. If the uninsured driver will not co-
operate the Bureau can either take executive action and negotiate a
settlement, relinquishing its right to any chance of recovery, or it can
wait until the court action begins when it may apply to be added as a
defendant. The difficulty in structuring these cases is that it is likely
that there will be no contractual relationship between the defendant
and the MIB. If there is no such relationship, any payment made will
be ex gratia, and as with criminal injuries compensation, this will
prevent a structure from being put into place: there is no antecedent
debt, as required by the case law, upon which to found any tax-free
instalment payments. In addition, if a judgment has to be obtained
against the defendant before the MIB will take responsibility, the
possibility of structuring the case will be lost.
3. An unidentified driver
The MIB are also responsible for providing compensation in cases
involving hit-and-run drivers who are not later identified. They may
or may not have been insured. Here there is no possibility of there
being any contractual relationship between the driver and the Board.
Again, therefore, payments are made on an ex gratia basis so that it
is not possible to establish an antecedent debt upon which to base the
tax-free annuities of a structure.
B. Where Provisional Damages are Involved
If there is a chance that the plaintiff will suffer some serious
deterioration in his condition it may be advisable to obtain a
provisional award of damages..This allows the plaintiff to return for
a further sum later if his condition in fact gets worse. Applications
for such orders are few. It appears that they may prevent a structure
taking place, although this is not certain.
There are two obstacles to structuring such awards. First, they
cannot be brought within the terms of the 1987 model agreement for
structures, as drawn up by the Association of British Insurers and
approved by the Revenue. This is because the standard form used in
the model requires the plaintiff to "discontinue any proceedings . . .
in connection with the claim", and this would not happen in
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a provisional award because the plaintiff is free to recommence
proceedings if necessary. It is not evident, however, why those
seeking a provisional award should be excluded from the benefits of
structuring. Modifications to the model agreement have been accepted
by the Revenue in other types of case, and some may think that the
agreement could not have been drafted with cases of provisional
damages in mind. On the other hand it may be that the ABI
were well aware of provisional damages when drafts of the model
agreement were being considered. Insurers strongly oppose structures
being subject to review if this means either that new money may have
to be introduced into the settlement at some distant date, or that
encouragement may be given to extending the grounds for review.
The fear is that there might be no clear limit to the extent or duration
of insurers' liability. The model agreement as presently drafted
therefore excludes any form of review. However, with structures as
they are at present there is no question of insurers' fears being
realised: no new money is being sought by those wishing to structure
provisional damages, nor are the grounds for review being increased
from what they are at present.
If a departure from the model agreement were accepted by the
Revenue, a second problem would arise. As described above, care
must be taken to ensure that a structure is put in place before a court
issues a formal order awarding the plaintiff a lump sum, whereas
provisional damages can only be arranged via a court order.55 It is
uncertain whether it is possible for a court to issue such an order
which incorporates by reference the terms of the agreed structured
settlement, and still allows application at a later date for further
damages. Although the court has discretion to make an order "on
such terms as it thinks just",56 the present procedures seem to
envisage settlements and court orders based only on lump sum
awards.
Without examining the complexities involved, the Law Commis-
sion state that a provisional damages award cannot be structured
because it results from a court judgment.57 The conclusion may be
correct, but the matter is by no means clear. The Commission
provisionally conclude that it is nevertheless desirable to facilitate the
structuring of such awards. This could be done by requiring the
Revenue "to recognise court orders facilitating structured . . . provi-
sional awards as a type of 'Model Agreement'", and by amending
the rules on provisional damages.58
55
 By R.S.C. Ord. 37 r. 8 and r. 9. The procedural issues are examined by D. Brennan, Provisional
Damages (1986), p. 31.
36
 R.S.C. Ord. 37 r. 8.
57
 Op. c(V.,para. 5.21.
58
 Ibid.
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C. A wards of Interim Damages
For reasons similar to those discussed in relation to provisional
damages, it is doubtful whether awards of interim damages can be
structured. This is, however, of little practical importance, since such
awards are usually for limited sums.59 They are often sought to enable
a plaintiff to establish a care regime for the immediate future, and
are not viewed as providing damages for life. Nevertheless the Law
Commission are in favour of the parties being able to structure
interim damages if they so wish.60
When considering the amount to be sought as an interim payment
a plaintiff's lawyer must balance the advantage to be gained by having
the money in the plaintiffs hands rather than the defendant's (thus
e.g. securing a full rate of interest), against the disadvantage of
removing capital from the potential structure. However, given that
the eventual settlements will usually make provision in any event for
a capital sum to cover contingencies, it is unlikely that much disservice
will be done to the plaintiff by seeking as large an interim award as
possible.61 Thus in Grainger v. Hagan an interim award of £350,000
was obtained.62 This was not thought sufficient to prejudice any later
structure of the outstanding damages of more than a million pounds,
and a structure was later put in place.
D. Cases Not Involving Personal Injury
Any attempt to extend the use of structures to other than cases of
personal injury would receive very close scrutiny from the Revenue.
The tax agreement with the ABI was reached for economic and social
reasons in order to give preferential treatment to the victims of
personal injury: they have long-term future needs, and, without
structures are more likely to become dependent upon the state. It is
by no means clear, however, that the legal authorities which allow
the tax-free payment of a capital debt by means of instalments are
necessarily to be confined to cases of personal injury.
In so far as structures blur the distinction between income and
capital, tax advisers might seek to utilise the concept in situations far
removed from that originally envisaged. In a family law context it is
already employed in North America by those rich enough to be able
to purchase an annuity to reduce the cost of paying maintenance to a
59
 However, they may be for a "reasonable proportion" of the damages the plaintiff would get at
trial.
w
 Op. cit. note 1 above, para. 5.21.
61
 Contrast Cherry, "Interim Payment And Provisional Damages" [1993] (1) Quantum 6.
62
 (1993) 9 Personal and Medical Injuries Law Letter 18.
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separated spouse.63 There is also discussion of whether it might be
used to settle breach of contract claims in employment cases,64 and
to provide a means for the parties to settle environmental damage
claims, especially if the cost of cleaning up the pollution is high and
the work involved likely to take some time.65 The possibility of
structuring environmental damage claims is already being investigated
in this country. Any long-term obligation to continue to provide care
and support, even if not in a personal injury context, is likely to
attract the attention of those at the forefront of the development of
structured settlements.66
The Law Commission made no detailed comment upon the
extension of structuring into these new areas because its focus was
upon personal injury cases. However, it did note that the victims of
other torts are less likely to have continuing long-term future needs,
and that preferential treament for them might be less justified.67
CONCLUSION
In looking at the ways in which encouragement can be given to
litigants to use structured settlements, it is essential to understand
the present legal regime which imposes restrictions upon the use of
the new form of compensation. The legal rules involved are complex
and bring together difficult issues of civil procedure, tax and insurance
law as well as the substantive law of tort. There is a considerable
amount of confusion as to the limits these rules impose upon
structures, and it is hoped that the analysis offered here clarifies the
issues involved. In particular, the article has sought to relate the
theoretical constraints imposed by the law to the realities of structured
settlement practice.
63
 F. McKellar, Structured Settlements: A Practitioner's Manual, p. 33, and Gross and Campbell,
"The American Experience" in I. Goldrein and M. de Haas (eds.). Structured Settlements
(1993), p. 232.
64
 Winslow, "Structured Settlements in Employment Litigation", Los Angeles Lawyer, April 1988.
65
 Kagels, "Structured Settlements under Superfund" (1992) 4(3) Environmental Claims J. 349;
Gross and Campbell, op. cit., p. 230. The National Structured Settlement Trade Association
estimates that over the next 10 years or so structures for environmental claims could exceed
those for personal injury.
66
 Further developments are signposted by Middlemass, "Structured Settlements" (1992) Canadian
Lawyer (Dec. issue) 41.
67
 Op. cit. note 1 above, para. 3.87.
